the Red Inheritors and the 21st century China Revolution
...'I‘m optimistic, because humanity is experiencing a revolution in historical cognition.'
Hello everyone, happy lunar New Year! …noting that this one is challenging, to put it mildly, for many in the PRC, facing adverse headwinds of many kinds.
Beijing Baselines has introduced the writings of Liang Jing on a couple of occasions. I outlined my acquaintance with him in ‘Master of Rationality’ (7 November 2022).
I translate his op-ed series, produced without fail every Tuesday night, with pleasure. While terse, they interweave current trends events with a distinctive theoretical framework. I don’t publish the translations regularly, however: they have lives of their own, plus a Chinese language context that does not always mesh with other issues of the day.
Some readers have registered distaste with what Liang Jing has to say; it would be tedious to make a mantra of Beijing Baselines’ primary principle of harking to a range of Chinese voices, not all of which are comfortable reading.
In this episode, we’re taking advantage of Liang’s recent deep dive touching on power shifts in Beijing, a hot topic seen in deeper historical context, and a vision of PRC political and social structure typically passed over in foreign media. A three-part op-ed in his regular series, it is published complete here..
Liang Jing
The Fate of the Red Inheritors and the China Revolution of the 21st century
Liang Jing, “The Red Inheritors and 21st century China revolution”, Ziyou Yazhou diantai, 梁京, “紅二代的命運與21世紀的中國大革命 (in Chinese, parts 1, 2 and 3))
Part (1)
A major news story in the first week of January 2024 was that Red Inheritors in the CPC1 recently collectively attacked Xi Jinping; they seemed ‘willing to be cut to pieces to unhorse the emperor’. The truth of this is hard to judge, but I’d argue that those Red Inheritors who still have some political acumen and energy must be in a very uneasy mood at this time: they know better than anyone that not only has Xi messed everything up—he is totally incapable of cleaning up the mess. He may instead direct a root-and-branch purge, utterly destroying himself and the country in the process.
They grasp, that is to say, that Xi is bringing calamity to the entire country; if not stopped, it will spell disaster for the Red Inheritors as well. The issue is, is it possible for them to stop Xi? Not even they know, I’d argue. They’re aware, however, they can no longer wait for others to take action. This is because
reports are not false that the tuanpai (Youth League faction)and retired CCP bosses tried to dissuade Xi to no avail—as the Red Inheritors are fully aware
Xi took power in the Red Inheritors’ name; its main figures supported him to varying degrees.
The Red Inheritors, that is to say, once thought Xi to be ‘one of them’, or that he would treat them as among his own. But Xi has repeatedly shown in his actions that he would antagonise anyone to remain emperor for one more day.
Aren’t the Inheritors afraid then that Xi will treat them as he did Ren Zhiqiang 任志强?2 On the one hand, I’d argue, they knew the risk, yet saw the situation as highly unfavourable to Xi. More to the point, risk of the entire situation getting out of control is rising sharply. If they don't take action now, even if Xi were soon to collapses, they themselves face imponderable collective risks. Acting now would in fact greatly boost their chances of overthrowing Xi; not least the odds of cajoling him to step down with dignity, boosting their chances of retaining a place in a post-Xi society.
In short, this is a case of ‘ no eggs under an overturned nest remain in one piece’. What’s rational about this is that failure to rebel and overthrow Xi would be be detrimental to the Red Inheritors and the country. But would success in doing so imply their ability to save the country and themselves? Few would see things this way, I think; even they themselves: few doubt that today’s PRC crisis is so severe that avoiding a 21st century China revolution is out of the question.
What would a successful Xi overthrow mean for the Inheritors’ fate, and that of the 21st century China Revolution? Above all, persuading him to abdicate honourably would be a good start for the revolution. This is evidenced by the historical logic of democratisation in Taiwan. Led by Chiang Ching-kuo 蒋经国, the ‘Blue Inheritors’ there knew that ending the party ban would inevitably ring the curtains on Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) power. Yet the new game gave them and their descendants chances to take part in democratic politics on an equal basis. Giving the Blue or Red generation and their offspring chances to take part in the democratic political game in future may not have been a good thing, it may be argued: their parents had after all done much evil that was harmful to nature, and owed so much blood debt.
In my opinion, if the 21st century China Revolution is not to repeat the tragedies and horrors of the 20th, a rational narrative of PRC modernisation, above all its modern nation-building, is needed. This new narrative cannot be accomplished in a rational manner without equal participation of all survivors’ descendants.
It is of course directly in virtue of errors in the 20th century China Revolution’s nation-building goals and political line that a 21st century version is inevitable. Yet neither Red nor Blue inheritors, nor their opponents, have so far made clear the underlying reasons.
…Red Inheritor culture is a ‘mule’ culture: an aristocratic culture with no progeny
Part (2)
How were the Red Inheritors able to play such a negative, yet major, role in contemporary PRC politics? Found not only in their social status and group hallmarks, the answer requires a larger historical vision. Can we offer a new interpretation of the conundrum that helps shape the future?
I‘m optimistic about this, because humanity is experiencing a revolution in historical cognition.
Building a framework for the China Revolution’s historical and cultural logic conducive to rational dialogue was impossible after the CPC’s founding, given political constraints due to the Cold War, and limitations of West’s own historiography. A major breakthrough in this area has taken place in recent years, clearly reflected in an explosion of unofficial and non-native Chinese historical narratives, reaching a very high level of expression. My own grasp of the Red Inheritors issue has benefited from these new historical narratives, notably Liu Zhongjing's discussion of the logic of political and cultural evolution,3 as well as Wang Gungwu's recent reflections on the concept of civilisation and culture.4
To grasp the 20th century China Revolution, the interaction of civilisations must be outlined in global historical perspective.
Liu Zhongjing
Liu's discussion of how Inner Asian civilisation affected the political order of East Asian unification deepened my understanding of why it was difficult for China to form a pattern of pluralistic autonomy,
Wang Gungwu
Wang Gungwu's reflections on differences between civilisation and cultural meaning helped me grasp why the civilisation based on the Chinese script tends to respond to crises of order by changing dynasties and rebuilding Grand Unity.
In detail, the 20th century China revolution was, put simply, one of Han people drawing Western cultural resources into the tradition of changing dynasties, of endlessly re-asserting the political order of Grand Unity. This model was pioneered by the 19th century Taiping Heavenly Kingdom; the 20th century China Revolution did no more than change the dynasty by borrowing nationalism, communism, and other modern ideological and cultural resources.
Is this highly destructive modern nation-building line, endlessly rebuilding Grand Unity, inevitable? Does the crisis facing the CPC regime and Red Inheritors today imply the PRC is in a catastrophe, and will have to go through another catastrophe of division and unification to complete building a modern state? My view is that
Without Western civilisation’s self-destruction in World War I, China's road to a republic would not have been so tortuous; without Japan’s war of aggression launched against China, and World War II, the CPC could not have set up its government, hence there would not have been such a serious national crisis as now;
The CPC's success in seizing power eliminated property rights and social autonomy, and the social contract is unsustainable. This is concentrated in the social and political privileges of the Red Inheritors, who lack legitimacy.
The Red Inheritors tried to empower themselves through new violence early in the Cultural Revolution, but this clashed with Mao's political goals. They were able to take part in the post-Mao era changes as victims of the Cultural Revolution. Yet they never gave up the dream of ‘The old man wins a realm, and his son sits on it’: on the one hand, they supported the June Fourth suppression, and on the other, they emigrated to developed countries. Their selfishness and opportunism promoted the PRC's economic opening, deepened its dependence with the outside world, and led themselves to fall into greater political embarrassment.
The Red Inheritors’ collective hallmark of failures outnumbering successes was forged by their awkward privileged position. There was no shortage of the talented and ambitious among them, but disasters and hatred their parents created made it hard for the outstanding to advance bravely; going with the flow and protecting themselves was an earlier choice. Theirs is a ‘mule’ culture: an aristocratic culture without no progeny.
This aristocracy’s barrenness is a vital clue for grasping how an incompetent like Xi not only rose as a Red Inheritor, but could be given full play. Given that both he and they are incompetent, is revolution then inevitable? Is China sure to once again self-destruct?
I’d argue there are reasons to resist this conclusion.
Part (3)
The 20th century was one in which human beings killed and destroyed each other on an unprecedented scale. Yet in the 1990s, with the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and Beijing's tilt to the West, an optimistic trend represented by the 'end of history’ theory prevailed. This has now been completely overtaken by another tendency, in which the prospects for mankind in the 21st century are not good. The challenge to the world order posed by the rise of the PRC was a key factor.
Deng Xiaoping's reforms allowed the Red Inheritors to have in-depth exchanges with Western elites. They were the first to realise that the rise of the Chinese economy in the 21st century exposed weaknesses and crises of Western civilisation, delivering China a historic opportunity to change the world order. Hence, before the 18th Party Congress (2012) the Red Inheritors with political ambitions were full of confidence that after Xi took power, Red China would score impressively on the world stage. LIn retrospect, their arrogance, like that of many powerful PRC cultural elites, fueled by an astonishing growth in national power, posed huge risks to the world order. Few at that time however saw its seriousness.
Why so? Was the risk simply due to Xi Jinping’s personal ambition and lack of talent? In other words, had Bo Xilai 薄熙来,5 more charismatic and with more Red Inheritor support, 'taken over' instead of Xi, would the challenge to the world order due to China's rise not have been much smaller, not bigger? How to respond to this question will test the depth and ability in historical interpretation.
The basic fact is that the rapid economic rise of the PRC was, like all major historical events, highly contingent. The greatest geopolitical contingency, some major tech breakthroughs aside, was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ending so dramatically and peacefully, the Cold War created an unimaginable global environment for the PRC's economic rise, deeply integrating it with the capitalist world economic system. The scale, speed and inequitable distribution of wealth brought huge consequences and disintegration effects to all social orders in the post-Cold War era, including the original socialist East and the most developed capitalist West.
Why should the PRC have become the greatest risk factor? This was of course because its wealth influx was not only the largest in scale: its negative effects were, due to institutional and cultural factors, the most prominent. The PRC has had the greatest impact on the rule of law and the order of democracies.
Against this background, no matter who takes over, the Red Inheritors will not be clear-headed, nor will they be able to systematically solve China's institutional problems. Instead, they will only choose to transfer the crisis to the outside world. Bo Xilai may reuse more capable ministers like Huang Qifan and capable Red Inheritors like Liu Yazhou, but I seriously doubt this means that this elite can transcend the constraints of the system and political culture.
Leaving aside these hypothetical issues for now, let’s look into what Xi’s personal choices and actions mean for future reconstruction of the order.
Xi Jinping is, I’d argue, afraid or unwilling to go on a killing spree; he severely damaged the PLA’s genuine combat power in order to establish himself as supreme ruler. This in fact greatly reduced the two major risks for the PRC and reconstruction of the world order: a large-scale domestic political violence incident taking place, and launch of large-scale wars abroad.
These two factors, coupled with Xi’s extreme isolation, having made political enemies all round, improve the odds of a successful collective rebellion by the PRC elite. Should he abdicate or lose power, they would have a chance to opt to reestablish political order via dialogue instead of fierce confrontation. The technological means that the PRC has now mastered also help its elites choose consultation to achieve political transformation and social reconstruction.
Specific to the Red Inheritors, the fact that Xi rather than Bo Xilai came to power may mean that he substituted his personal failure to govern the country for the Red Inheritors’ failure of collective governance: a historical opportunity to make a decent collective curtain call.
The term hóng èrdài 红二代 literally means ‘second-generation reds’ or ‘princelings’: offspring of senior (CPC) leaders of the Mao era. Often rising to high-rank within the party-state, they benefit from family background and connections, giving them status and privileges not available to the general population.
Former property mogul and outspoken critic of Xi Jinping, Ren was sentenced to 18 years in prison on charges of corruption. A member of the CPC inner circle, Ren called Xi a ‘clown’ (小丑 xiǎochǒu) over his handling of the COVID-19 outbreak. After circulating a critique, he went missing in March 2020.
On Liu Zhongjing, see Dylan Levi King, ‘China’s intellectual dark web and its most active fanatic’, The China Project, 13 March 2019. ‘What’s happening in Xinjiang is a tragedy. If we look at things from a historical point of view, Xinjiang, since ancient times, has had a closer relationship with Central Asia and Southwest Asia than East Asia. In the earliest periods of Chinese history—the Zhou and Han Dynasties, for example—the ethnic composition was different. What is now Gansu and the Hexi-Gansu Corridor was populated by people related to Persians: their language, culture, and skin colour were similar (some even had blond hair and blue eyes).
Lushan 安禄山 (C.E.703—757) and the Nine Tribes of Zhaowu [Sogdians] in the Tang Dynasty, too, were of Persian descent. Mainstream archeologists indeed say the name Zhaowu comes from those people in Gansu; they would have had blond hair and blue eyes, t=like those of the ‘Beauty of Loulan’ [Caucasian mummy discovered in Xinjiang in 1980]. They didn’t have Mongolian ancestors.’
Wang Gungwu 王庚午, AO, CBE is an Australian historian, sinologist, and writer specialising in the history of China and Southeast Asia. ‘In the aftermath of World War II, the region of Southeast Asia was conceived. National empires were also dismantled, and with the creation of the UN came the rise of the new notion of nation-states… Prof Wang examines how Southeast Asia transformed into a modern region in light of these developments around the world, and highlights the impact of modernisation on the ancient Indic, Islamic and Sinic civilisations in our region.’
Son of Mao-era minister Bo Yibo 薄一波, Bo Xilai rose via his success as the Mayor of Dalian, Governor of Liaoning, and Minister of Commerce, becoming Politburo member. Party Secretary of Chongqing and a top political rival of Xi Jinping before Xi became the paramount leader. His downfall, like that of his ally ‘security czar‘ Zhou Yongkang 周永康 was a political earthquake, not least a settling of factional politics under Xi. Bo's political career ended with his removal from Chongqing post, dismissal from the Politburo and conviction on corruption charges.
I enjoyed this though democratic centralism means we're not going to be privy to the actual infighting, resulting in rampant speculation, leading to political miscalculation, which can in turn result in war. Thank you for the cheng yu , they would have been even better with the hanzi, very few people use cheng yu in English. I don't think Xi is incompetent. Excoriating him is probably foolish. I do think he is actually communist, and also think he is trying to prove to himself and the party, that his father and family were not in the wrong. I might be somehow mistake, which is why I write these words. I shall try to reread your article later, it is well written and fully packed so I do think it needs a rereading.
Interesting read! Though I am not sure this cohort has much clout or relevance today, and that’s not just because of Xi’s grip on power. As the author himself correctly put it: it’s a mule aristocracy, even worse than UK’s House of Lords in terms of political relevance