No photo of Liang Jing, a nom-de-plume, is appropriate. Here’s an old sketch of Emperor Shun (23rd century BCE), accredited as a shaper of Chinese civilisation.
I met Liang Jing 梁京 in Beijing around 2000, introduced by Dai Qing 戴晴, a renowned investigative journalist and historian in the reform era (1978- ).1 Her husband, known to many as ‘Lao Wang’, a nick-surname not unlike ‘Smithy’ or ‘Jonesy’, was a hydro-engineer.
Himself a hydro-engineer initially, hence known to Lao Wang, Liang Jing (a nom-de-plume) had crossed over to economics, now in demand in the market reform era. He took a doctorate, worked on the ‘household responsibility’ system in the Zhao Ziyang think tanks, and helped theorise the dual-track pricing system. Tiananmen spelled the end of that era; Liang set off for further postgrad studies at an American university.
When we met, he had recently returned as China rep of an American NGO in poverty alleviation. Liang took me on me as an associate, translator, bag carrier, etc. We travelled, writing up projects in the poverty-afflicted limestone karst country of Guizhou. I translated his writings, at first promotional material for the NGO, then his more personal theoretical and journalistic writing.
Over the decades 1999-2019 that I and my partner Philippa Jones spent in Beijing, Liang Jing was at longish intervals a regular in our apartment near the Workers Stadium. Despite a good track record in Bangladesh and Vietnam, his NGO was to fall victim to ‘deep problems’ unique to the PRC, not least the perverse incentive structures described in John Fitzgerald’s Cadre Country. Liang hung on in his hometown in Jiangxi, starting a weekly op-ed that in those days could be safely published offshore. He eventually moved back to the US where he had family, regularly touching his China bases on return trips.
I started translating Liang Jing’s op-eds, for fun, interest and to keep up my language skills; I’ve never stopped, in fact, and have hundreds on file, touching on virtually every major policy and political event of the Hu-Wen and Xi-Li eras.
His standpoint, initially focused on development economics, has absorbed more and more elements of political science, history and cultural theory, and even psychology.
Of the many friends and colleagues to whom I’ve circulated it, some have been critical, puzzling over these elements, sometimes dismissing it as the wanderings of an autodidact. For me, Liang Jing is a Chinese voice I know, trust and find resonant with my own perceptions. Occasional inaccuracies are mainly with regard to US and other non-Chinese regional political cultures. On China, he is knowledgeable and insightful.
Above all, he embodies the authentic traditions of rationality and sincerity of Chinese scholar-officials of old. With his grounding in economics, rationality is a topic in which he has some mastery. We’ve been exchanging views and changing each other’s minds for a long time, and I’ve long awaited the chance to share my experience more widely.
The following are two recent op-eds in his regular series. Be prepared for a critical tone regarding the regime…
Liang Jing
How long can Xi Jinping’s rump court last?2
Those who all along had full confidence in Xi’s ‘re-election’ are not, I’d think, in a good mood now. On the contrary, despite the ‘inaccuracy’ of their predictions, those who thought he wouldn’t be re-elected are more convinced that their take on the situation was soberer than betting it was assured. We all know the reasons: one was Hu Jintao’s dramatic exit from the venue; the other, of course, was the new Standing Committee made of Xi mafia and army members, stunning everyone. Only by going his own way, anyone with a little common sense will grasp, was Xi ‘re-elected’. And this will only result in desertion by his followers.
We are clearly witnessing a 21st-century ’Yuan Shikai proclaimed emperor’ moment.3 How this historic event will unfold is becoming the core content of a ‘quiz’ for political commentators. ‘Objective’ political forecasts are tough for politics nerds: even if they genuinely believe themselves objective, they can’t evade the ’uncertainty principle’: the more energetically one takes part, the harder it is to be objective.
Nor is striving for objectivity made pointless by this: this pursuit not only reflects the participants’ values and political vision, but of necessity demonstrates their political ability to play the game of rationality. This ability is an indispensable strategic tool for continuing human civilisation; the spectacle of Xi ‘bullying his way through’ the Congress just confirmed the worry that many have always had—that Xi has no such ability at all. Hence the higher his position, the less constrained his power. Whichever direction he takes must bring disaster to China and the world. Why then do so many ‘support’ Xi as emperor? Motives and calculations vary, but generally speaking, Chinese political games are indisputably far from the ’civilised drama’ of modern politics.
The real question now is, will China repeat the catastrophe that followed Yuan Shikai’s failed bid for the empire? It’s possible of course, and disasters are sure to be predicted, but pondering and discussing Chinese politics can’t stop there. Having placed himself and the Party in dire straits, has Xi delivered China a chance to ’be reborn’? Being an unrepentant reformist, I think this opportunity exists, or at least is worth fighting for.
I quoted this from Arthur Smith’s Chinese Characteristics in my last op-ed: ’The Chinese are a race with strong acting instincts.’ The sentence is in fact problematic, given that acting is instinctive for all human beings, but the difference between Chinese and Western cultures is clearly seen in how they relate drama and life. The West is inclined to see that ‘a play is like life’, while the East, not least China, is more inclined to see ‘life is like a play’. Christian belief, that is to say, led to Western drama seeking to express the genuineness of life, while China’s highly secularised, differential society never let go of the concept of life being like a game. I raise this for two reasons:
Hu Jintao played no tricks at the last moment. This may relate to the influence of Soviet and Russian culture in his youth, but in any case, he impacted Xi Jinping’s ascension drama, threatening the legitimacy of Xi’s rump court.
the new Standing Committee members, uniformly servile to Xi, have a fundamental communication barrier with the PRC technocratic system: a drama of minions is hard to align with one of ’professionalism’.
Technocrats typified by Wang Yang have worked extremely hard. Casting him out means that technocrats will generally choose to ’lie flat’, as China’s economy faces the risk of a cliff-like collapse.
How will the 20th Congress drama continue? Whatever Hu Jintao’s personal fate, he left a clear political testament, in my judgement, for holding a special Party congress during the term of 20th National Congress. Xi Jinping’s rump court will not, in other words, last five years, giving China a chance to survive.
Liang Jing
Xi Jinping’s fortunes and the reconstruction of the world order4
Biden recently commented on Xi Jinping's current state, to the effect that Xi is a little overwhelmed and clueless. It is rare for an American to mock a Chinese president like this. Biden evidently knows that Xi is not having an easy time, but was there any deeper political meaning than scoffing at Xi? I think there was: he hopes that, unlike Putin, Xi will turn back from the wrong path and retreat in the face of difficulties.
What is the meaning, it may be asked, of Biden’s fighting for Xi to transform at this time? My view is that as long as there is a glimmer of hope, it is absolutely necessary for the US to fight for Xi's transformation and cooperation with China: were Xi to change his anti-US stance, and were China and the US to cooperate to deal with the serious challenges to the world order, hundreds of millions, if not billions, of lives may be saved.
I’ve learned that the contents of Peter Zeihan's new book The End of the World is Just the Beginning, which I’ve mentioned previously, have spread among the PRC intellectual elite. Those who know these contents will, I’d argue, be shocked by the logic of the global catastrophe depicted in the author's panorama, especially by its warning of impending catastrophe in China.
Covertly abetted by Xi Jinping, Putin openly launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, detonating the 21st century’s world order crisis, but also a climate change crisis, and starting a calamitous rapid deglobalisation of the world economy. Scariest was that the vast majority of states, political leaders and business elites were utterly unprepared. This means that the chances of the worst possible outcomes depicted in the book are greatly increased. Billions of people, including hundreds of millions of Chinese, may die as a result, not least from famine, a scourge that many thought was a thing of the past.
After listening to his book, I couldn't help being in awe of Zeihan: his warning gave the world, not least Chinese people, a chance to save themselves and others. Can Xi seize this chance? I hope so; should he do so, he will be a more fortunate historical figure than Stalin. Stalin was a villain, but he seized the chance Hitler gave him to become a ‘liberator’ and ‘victor’. Xi too is a great villain, yet is far below Stalin's level; if he could wake up, he would benefit all people in the world and be accorded immense merit and virtue.
Xi can’t change his tune, many may think: lacking Stalin's ability, he can neither withdraw nor do something good. This, I’d argue, is exactly the meaning of what Biden was telling him. He was saying, ‘You have one last chance to choose, which is to say, with the stakes so high, the US and the world are willing to give you a last chance’.
Xi’s problem is that he has so many enemies in the Party and at home. Wouldn’t it be suicidal for him to rest his sword at this time? Considering their own interests, the Party leadership is, in my view, willing to allow him to withdraw decently. What matters is that enough people in China believe that there is a historic opportunity to ‘live and let live’, that is to say, China has the possibility of resetting the rules and moral baseline of the game of power.
What to make of such a possibility existing? What makes it historically difficult for China to have such chances? This is a tough question. My explanation is that it is historically very difficult for a person, by withdrawing, not only to benefit the world, but to be known by the world for it. Cao Cao realised the ‘principle’ of ‘I would rather let the world down, than be let down by the world’:5 when so many were willing to commit murder to rule the world, it was pointless for an aspiring strong man to withdraw from the competition. But times have changed: Xi Jinping is fortunate to have a chance not only to benefit the world by withdrawing, but to be known for it as well.
Working with high hopes of political reform in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, Dai went on to produce important statements on the Three Gorges Dam and was a leading light in the liberal-democratic camp. She has been featured in many writings by Geremie Barmé. See his China Heritage, in particular a recent notice of her 80th birthday.
Liang Jing, "How long can Xi Jinping’s rump court last?”, Ziyou Yazhou diantai, 25 October 2022 [梁京:“习近平的小朝廷能撑到几时?”,自由亚洲电台,2022年10月 25日 (in Chinese).].
Trans.: In an attempt to restore the Empire under his own rule in 1912, late Qing dynasty official Yuan Shikai 袁世凯 (1859-1916) betrayed the 1911 revolution, despite being proclaimed President. He died shortly after the attempt failed.
Liang Jing, "Xi Jinping’s advances and retreats and rebuilding the world order”, Ziyou Yazhou diantai, 31 August 2022 [梁京:“習近平的進退與世界秩序的重建”,自由亚洲电台,2022年8月 31日 (in Chinese).].
(Trans.): Cao Cao 曹操 (155-220 CE) Warlord of the late Eastern Han Dynasty, a military strategist, statesman, writer and poet, and founder of the Cao Wei kingdom in the Three Kingdoms era. He is celebrated in the classic novel, Romance of the Three Kingdoms.
Thanks Sean. Let me know your thoughts when you've imbibed... Shun is a great rendering of Sean.
Hi, Daev. Looking forward to reading your piece. But have only got as far as caption for the moment - where I saw my Chinese name: (傅) 舜 (恩). Happy memories of my old Chinese teacher in HK, who chose it for me! Best wishes: Sean